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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - RAN-
DOM STOPPING OF VEHICLES BY POLICE FOR ROUTINE
CHECKS OF LICENSE AND VEHICLE REGISTRATION
VIOLATES FOURTH AMENDMENT. GOODE v. STATE, 41 Md.
App. 623, 398 A.2d 801 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Goode v. State,1 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held
that the random stopping of an automobile to make a routine check
of the driver's license and vehicle registration is a violation of the
fourth amendment right against unreasonable seizures if the stop is
not justified by a reasonable suspicion that some criminal activity is
being committed, has been committed, or is about to be committed.
2
The court upheld as facially constitutional the provisions of the
Maryland Transportation Code that require the motorist to display
his license and registration, 3 but held that these provisions were
unconstitutionally applied in Goode.
4
This casenote examines the impact of the Goode decision on
prior Maryland case law and analyzes the recent Supreme Court
decision in Delaware v. Prouse,5 which addressed the identical issue.
The implications of these two cases for future automobile stops are
also considered.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At approximately 11:10 p.m., a Baltimore City policeman on
random patrol observed an automobile parked in an isolated area by
an abandoned school.' The officer watched the car for a few minutes
until it drove away and then followed this "suspicious vehicle,"
1. 41 Md. App. 623, 398 A.2d 801, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
2. Id. at 628, 398 A.2d at 804.
3. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 13-409, 16-112 (1977). Section 13-409 states:
(a) In general - At all times, each registration card shall be carried:
(1) In the vehicle to which it refers; or
(2) By the individual driving or in control of the vehicle, who shall
display it, on demand, to any police officer who identifies himself as
such.
Section 16-112 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Possession and display of license; writing sample -
(1) In this subsection, "display" means the manual surrender of the
licensee's license into the hands of the demanding officer for inspection.
(2) Each individual driving a motor vehicle on any highway in this
State shall:
(i) Have his license with him;
(ii) Display the license to any uniformed police officer who demands
it . . ..
4. 41 Md. App. 623, 627-28, 398 A.2d 801, 804, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
5. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
6. Goode v. State, 41 Md. App. 623, 624, 398 A.2d 801, 802, cert. denied, 285 Md.
730 (1979).
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intending to pull it over. The vehicle was halted although no traffic
laws had been violated.7 After the driver was unable to produce
either his driver's license or the vehicle registration, the officer
asked the occupants to get out of the car.8 One of these passengers,
when told to remove his hands from his pocket, unintentionally
dropped his wallet on the ground. A glassine bag containing white
powder fell out of the wallet. This passenger was informed that he
was under arrest for possession of a controlled dangerous substance.9
The policeman returned to the vehicle and inspected the interior of
the car, finding three weapons. Two of the passengers were
subsequently charged with three handgun violations."°
At a suppression hearing, the defendants asserted that their
arrests were illegal and that any evidence seized was therefore
inadmissible." The trial court determined that the officer had the
authority to stop the vehicle and request the operator to produce a
driver's license and registration card. 2 The court further determined
that, because the driver was unable to produce a license or
registration, the police were authorized to order the occupants from
their car. Regarding the subsequent search, the court stated that the
activity of the defendants as a whole constituted sufficient probable
cause to justify the officer's search of the car to see if it contained
any controlled dangerous substances or weapons. 3 Consequently, the
evidence obtained from the automobile was held admissible, and the
motion to suppress was denied. The defendants were each convicted
of three handgun violations. 4
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND RANDOM
STOPS OF AUTOMOBILES
It is well established that the fourth amendment 5 protects
motorists from unreasonable searches and seizures. 6 Automobile
7. Id. at 624-25, 398 A.2d at 802.
8. Id. at 625, 398 A.2d at 803.
9. Id. The person arrested for possession of a controlled dangerous substance was
not an appellant in Goode. Id. at 625 n.3, 398 A.2d at 803 n.3.
10. The driver of the vehicle was charged and tried along with the appellants, but
was acquitted by the jury. Id. at 625 n.1, 398 A.2d at 803 n.1.
11. Id. at 626, 398 A.2d at 803.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 624, 398 A.2d at 802.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment "was a reaction to the evils of
the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the
Colonies, and was intended to protect against invasions of 'the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life' from searches under indiscriminate
authority." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (quoting Boyd v.
(Footnote 15 Cont'd next page)
16. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1975); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
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stops raise two constitutional issues implicating the fourth amend-
ment: (1) whether a particular stop constitutes a "seizure" and (2)
whether the stop is reasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. The random stop, one of four types of automobile stops, 7
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). See generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); N. LASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 51-78 (1937). The safeguards of the fourth
amendment developed almost simultaneously in England and in the American
colonies. In England, general warrants issued by the secretary of state had
been used to search for and arrest authors and publishers of seditious material.
Id. at 37-38. The use of these warrants was not seriously questioned for over
125 years until the case of Wilkes v. Woods, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763). Wilkes, a
member of Parliament, had authored a series of monographs criticizing the
King. After the seizure of his material, Wilkes brought suit challenging the
validity of general warrants. The court eliminated the use of general warrants,
holding them to be "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." Id. at 498.
At the same time that these warrants were being eliminated, however, writs of
assistance were being issued in the Colonies under authority of the King
empowering officers of the Crown to search indiscriminately the possessions of
the colonists for smuggled goods. N. LASSON, supra, at 51-78. Subsequent acts
by Parliament and the continued use of the writs was a source of friction
between the colonists and England which proved to be one of the principal
causes leading to the American Revolution. Id.
With the conclusion of the hostilities, the new nation sought to establish
constitutional safeguards designed to eliminate many of the abuses previously
experienced at the hands of their English rulers. The result was the enactment
of the fourth amendment which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizure, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Automobile stops by police fall into four basic categories: the investigatory stop,
the traffic violation stop, the roadblock stop, and the random stop. See Note,
Automobile Spot Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 85 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Automobile Spot Checks]. The investigatory stop is a brief
detention of the motorist to make inquiries into his possible criminal activities.
Id. at 97. The constitutional standard for stopping an automobile in such a
situation has been "reasonable suspicion." United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15,
18 (10th Cir. 1972); Young v. United States, 435 F.2d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Reasonable suspicion requires that certain circumstances exist such that the
officer is justified in briefly detaining the motorist and is not acting arbitrarily.
Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966). For instance, when an
officer stops a particular make and model of automobile that fits the general
description of one used in a recent crime, his actions will be justified even
though the vehicle stopped is not the one sought. See Automobile Spot Checks,
supra, at 98.
The traffic violation stop occurs when an observable traffic violation is
committed by a motorist or an equipment problem exists and a police officer
pulls the vehicle over. Id. at 101. There is little difficulty with regard to the
constitutionality of these stops because the violation itself provides probable
cause for the stop. Id.
The roadblock stop is used by police to stop all the oncoming traffic in order
to check for a valid driver's license and registration and for possible equipment
problems. Id. at 99-100. This procedure has been recognized as constitutional
under the fourth amendment when used to regulate illegal alien traffic near
the Mexican border. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1975).
The indiscriminate stopping of all vehicles removes the possibility of police
authorities abusing their discretion while at the same time reducing the fear
and anxiety caused by a sudden show of authority. Id. at 559-60.
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has raised significant fourth amendment problems. A random stop
occurs when a vehicle is stopped at the discretion of a police officer
for a license and registration check. 8 The stop is made in the absence
of any observable traffic violation, equipment problem, or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. 9 Virtually all jurisdictions have
statutes granting police officers the authority to check the validity of
the license and vehicle registration of motorists. 0 While this type of
statute is facially constitutional, it is subject to abuse in practice
because it is interpreted by police to extend an unlimited right to
stop motorists at any time.2 These statutes have provided an excuse
for police to stop cars capriciously or in accordance with a personal
prejudice.
22
Initially, some jurisdictions concluded that no fourth amend-
ment issue was involved in random stops because such stops did not
constitute an arrest.23 In Terry v. Ohio,24 however, the Supreme
Court considered the issue of what type of conduct by a police officer
constitutes a seizure of the individual, holding that "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has 'seized' that person."25 The Court, in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce,26 extended this rule to automobile stops, stating that
a seizure occurs whenever a motorist is detained by a show of
authority.27 Thus, a random stop is a seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.
2 8
Once it has been determined that a seizure has occurred, the
next factor to be considered is the reasonableness of such action. In
Camara v. Municipal Court,29 the Supreme Court stated that there is
"no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which
18. For the purposes of this article, the definition of random stop is limited to those
occasions when a police officer stops a vehicle to check the driver's license and
registration. See Automobile Spot Checks, supra note 17, at 98-99.
19. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979).
20. See, e.g., MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 13-409, 16-112 (1977). See generally
Comment, Interference With The Right To Free Movement: Stopping And
Search Of Vehicles, 51 CAL. L. REv. 907, 916 n.76 (1963).
21. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); Goode v. State, 41 Md. App. 623,
630, 398 A.2d 801, 805, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
22. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); Goode v. State, 41 Md. App. 623,
630, 398 A.2d 801, 805, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
23. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1966); State v. Fish,
280 Minn. 163, 159 N.W.2d 786 (1968).
24. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
25. Id. at 16.
26. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
27. Id. at 878. Accord, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622
(8th Cir. 1971); Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1969).
28. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
29. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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the search [or seizure] entails."3 This requires weighing the state's
interest in the seizure against the degree of intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected rights of the individual." Generally, the
state interest asserted in justification for random stops is the
promotion of highway safety." The individual interests asserted are
the right to be free from arbitrary state interference, the right to free
passage on the roadways, and the right to privacy. 33
The state courts are split over the results of balancing these
competing interests. Jurisdictions that have held that individual
rights outweigh the state interest 34 have done so by reasoning that,
because it is unconstitutional to give the police absolute and
unreviewable discretion to stop motorists at random, there must be
specific facts justifying an intrusion.3 ' According to these jurisdic-
tions, to allow discretionary stops could result in the police
attempting to detect crimes in an arbitrary manner rather than add
to roadway safety.36 Without some limitations, police could use the
license check as a pretext, justifying stops actually made to
investigate motorists suspected of criminal activity. 7
Those jurisdictions that have upheld random stops 38 have
concluded that the licensing laws are valid safety measures and that
the benefits of their enforcement outweigh any limited intrusion
30. Id. at 536-37. Accord, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554-55
(1975).
31. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654 (1979).
32. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1979), the state argued that a
strong interest in public safety exists and that a legitimate means of insuring
safety is to permit random stops to verify that the motorist has a valid driver's
license and registration card. Accord, Comment, Interference With The Right
To Free Movement: Stopping And Search Of Vehicles, 51 CAL. L. REV. 907
914-15 (1963).
33. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Common-
wealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United
States v. Cupps, 503 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Nicholas, 448
F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971); State v. Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 444 (1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097 (1976); People v. Ingle, 36
N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973).
35. Typical of these cases is the decision in Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa.
107, 111, 307 A.2d 875, 878 (1973), in which the court held that a random stop
in the absence of specific facts justifying the intrusion violated the individual's
fourth amendment rights.
36. See, e.g., id. at 110, 307 A.2d at 879.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S.
389 (1973); State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975); State v.
Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973); Leonard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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upon the individual's rights. 9 Under this view, the slight intrusion
occasioned by a random stop does not warrant fourth amendment
protection.
Prior to Goode v. State, 0 Maryland courts upheld random stops,
finding them to be a legitimate means of promoting the state's
interest in highway safety.41 For example, in Kraft v. State,2 the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated that the licensing
provisions 43 gave police the absolute right to stop a motorist at any
time and demand the display of his driver's license and vehicle
registration." The court implied that the propriety of a stop is
subject solely to the police officer's discretion.4 Goode expressly
overruled all prior decisions insofar as they sanctioned random
stops.4
IV. THE COURT'S REASONING
Relying primarily on the language of Terry v. Ohio, 47 the Goode
court reasoned that there may be a forcible stop of a motorist only "if
the stop is based upon 'specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant [the] intrusion.'-48 The court further explained that there
must be reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed, is
about to be committed, or has been committed, stating that a
contrary holding would give police absolute discretion to invade the
privacy of motorists on the outside chance that the operator of the
vehicle would be unlicensed or driving an improperly registered
vehicle .49
39. See, e.g., State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 342, 231 N.W.2d 672, 675 (1975)
("The inconvenience experienced by the individual motorist is relatively slight
compared to the benefits to be derived from strict enforcement of our licensing
laws.").
40. 41 Md. App. 623, 398 A.2d 801, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
41. Kraft v. State, 18 Md. App. 169, 305 A.2d 489 (1973); Glover v. State, 14 Md.
App. 454, 287 A.2d 333, cert. denied, 265 Md. 737 (1972); Byrd v. State, 13 Md.
App. 288, 283 A.2d 9 (1971), cert. denied, 264 Md. 746 (1972); Taylor v. State, 9
Md. App. 402, 264 A.2d 870 (1970); Burkett v. State, 5 Md. App. 211, 245 A.2d
911 (1968), cert. denied, 252 Md. 730 (1969).
42. 18 Md. App. 169, 305 A.2d 489 (1973).
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, §§ 3-409(a), 6-112 (recodified as MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. §§ 13-409(a), 16-112 (1977)).
44. 18 Md. App. 169, 173, 305 A.2d 489, 492 (1973).
45. Id.
46. 41 Md. App. 623, 628, 398 A.2d 801, 804, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
47. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48. 41 Md. App. 623, 631, 398 A.2d 801, 806, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
49. 41 Md. App. 623, 630, 398 A.2d 801, 805, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
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In determining whether a random stop is warranted, the court
balanced the state's interest against the individual rights of the
motorist.0 While recognizing that the state has a valid and vital
interest in highway safety, the court emphasized the overriding
importance of the motorist's right to be protected from unreasonable
seizure. Applying the balancing test, it was evident to the court that,
in light of the fourth amendment, the individual's interest weighed
more heavily than the state's interest, especially because the state
has other adequate means of protecting the public's interest in
highway safety. The court emphasized that the factual basis
necessary to justify stopping a motorist for a routine check is
minimal: "An actual violation of the motor vehicle sections of the
Transportation Article need not be detected. 'All that is required is
that the stop be not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle
curiosity.' ,51 Reviewing the facts in Goode, the court concluded that
this minimal standard had not been met and the stop was therefore
unconstitutional.
52
V. EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
A. The Prouse Decision
Less than three weeks after the Goode opinion was issued, the
Supreme Court decided the case of Delaware v. Prouse.1 The issue
before the Court in Prouse was the same as that decided in Goode.
Therefore, an evaluation of Goode requires consideration of the
decision in Prouse.
In Prouse, a police officer made a random stop of a vehicle to
check the driver's license and vehicle registration.- As he
approached the vehicle, the officer smelled marijuana and subse-
quently seized a quantity of marijuana lying in plain view on the
floor of the car. Charged with illegal possession of a controlled
substance, the driver argued that the initial random stop had been
an illegal seizure in violation of the fourth amendment.55 The trial
court granted defendant's motion to suppress the seized evidence,
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.5 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve the conflicting
decisions among the various jurisdictions. 5
50. Id.
51. Id. at 630-31, 398 A.2d at 806 (quoting State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297, 304,
232 N.W.2d 906, 911 (1975)) (footnote omitted).
52. 41 Md. App. 623, 631, 398 A.2d 801, 806, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
53. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Goode was decided Mar. 8, 1979 and Prouse was decided on
Mar. 27, 1979.
54. Id. at 650.
55. Id.
56. State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359 (Del. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
57. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 651 nn.2 & 3 (1979).
1980]
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In holding the random stop unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
employed a balancing test to determine whether the individual's
interests outweighed the government's interests.' Although the
Court found that the state's interest in highway safety was vita5 9
and the intrusion upon the individual's interest modest,60 it con-
cluded that the random stop was so ineffective as a means of
promoting highway safety that the state's interest failed to -outweigh
the individual's rights under the fourth amendment.6 The Court
held that, because the random stop was not an efficient enforcement
technique, the intrusion upon the individual's interest was un-
reasonable in the absence of some reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.
62
In addition, the Court relied upon its holding in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce,63 which dealt with random stops near the Mexican
border. In Brignoni-Ponce, the government sought unlimited discre-
tion to stop any vehicle at random to determine if it contained illegal
aliens.64 The Court held that the border patrol could not make such
random stops in the absence of some specific and articulable facts
which raise a reasonable suspicion of some criminal activity.65 The
Court in Prouse concluded that the random stop to check for
licensing and registration strongly resembled the random stop in
border search cases and was at least as unreasonable.'
B. The Goode Decision
In arriving at its decision, the Goode court balanced the
competing state and individual interests to determine the reason-
ableness of random stops by police 7.6 This test of reasonableness has
been articulated by the Supreme Court and requires balancing the
governmental interests served by the seizure against the degree to
which the seizure interferes with the interests of individuals.6 9 In
Goode, the court noted that although the state's interest in highway
58. Id. at 663.
59. Id. at 658.
60. Id. at 653-55. Accord, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880
(1975) (random stop of a vehicle to check for illegal aliens termed modest
intrusion).
61. 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
62. Id. at 663.
63. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
64. Id. at 876.
65. Id. at 884.
66. 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979).
67. 41 Md. App. 623, 630, 398 A.2d 801, 806, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
68. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 109 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554-55
(1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1974); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
534-35 (1967).
69. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1980).
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safety was "valid and vital,"7 the individual's right to be free from
arbitrary state interference was of greater significance and therefore
outweighed the state's interest.'
A shortcoming of the Goode decision is the court's failure to
determine the extent to which the seizure promotes the state's
interest. When the state and individual interests are of relatively
equal importance, the effectiveness of the means used to further the
state interest becomes a critical factor in the outcome of the
balancing test. 2 In Goode, the state's interest in highway safety is
arguably as important as the individual's right to be free from
arbitrary state intrusion. What tips the scale in favor of the
individual is that the random stop is an inefficient and ineffective
means of promoting the state's interest.
When a police officer makes a random stop, he seizes a motorist
and requests his driver's license and the vehicle registration card.
The stop is designed to insure that the motorist is validly licensed
and that the vehicle is properly registered. If the random stop is to
be considered a valid enforcement technique, it should be an
effective means of apprehending licensing and registration violators
and deterring future violators.
Although statistical data is unavailable,73 it is safe to assume
that only a fraction of one percent of the drivers in Maryland are
unlicensed.7' At the same time, there are approximately 2,700,000
properly licensed drivers in the state.75 Employing the random stop
method, a police officer must stop an enormous number of motorists
who are lawfully operating their vehicles in order to find licensing
violators. The chance of finding an unlicensed driver among all
drivers is slight. In Delaware v. Prouse,6 the Supreme Court
expressed this view, stating that "the contribution to highway safety
made by the discretionary stops selected from among drivers
generally will, therefore, be marginal at best."77 Thus, the method is
ineffective as a means of apprehending licensing violators.
70. 41 Md. App. 623, 630, 398 A.2d 801, 805, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
71. Id.
72. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654 (1979).
73. The only information available from the Maryland Department of Transporta-
tion Public Information Division concerning unlicensed drivers was that 2,555
people were found guilty in Maryland of driving without a license in the year
1977-1978. Telephone interviews with staff members of the Maryland Depart-
ment of Transportation Public Information Division, in Baltimore City (Jan.
31, 1980).
74. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1979) ("It seems common sense
that the percentage of all drivers on the roads who are driving without a
license is very small . . ").
75. Telephone interviews with staff members of the Maryland Department of
Transportation Public Information Division, in Baltimore City (Jan. 31, 1980).
76. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
77. Id. at 660.
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In addition to its failure to facilitate apprehension of violators,
the random stop fails to deter licensing violations. One essential
aspect of an effective regulatory scheme is a deterrent effect on
potential violators."' The notion that the random stop has such an
effect is unrealistic. Given the enormous number of drivers in
Maryland, there is a minute chance that an unlicensed driver who is
properly operating his vehicle will ever be stopped by the police.
Consequently, the deterrent effect is negligible at best. As expressed
in Prouse, "[i]n terms of actually discovering unlicensed drivers or
deterring them from driving, the [random stop] does not appear
sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement
practice."79
Finally, the random stop is unnecessary because the state has
other more adequate means for promoting highway safety. 0 The
principal purpose of statutory provisions requiring drivers to be
licensed is to insure that motorists have certain minimal driving
skills and knowledge. If these licensing requirements are valid
methods of insuring safety, it must be assumed that unlicensed
drivers who have in some way failed to comply with these standards
are more likely to commit traffic violations than licensed drivers.81
Because any traffic violation, including an equipment problem,
permits an officer to stop the vehicle and check the driver's license
and registration,"' it follows that more unlicensed drivers are likely
to be stopped under the traffic violation stop than under the random
stop method.8
In arriving at its decision, the Goode court noted the interest in
highway safety as the state's only justification for the random stop.,,
In reality, however, the state has used the random stop to further a
second interest - crime detection and prevention. The facts in Goode
aptly demonstrate this point. The passengers in the car in Goode
were not stopped because the officer wished to check the driver's
license and vehicle registration in an effort to promote highway
safety. On the contrary, they were stopped because the officer
was suspicious of possible criminal activity. 5 The enforcement of
licensing and registration provisions was merely a pretext for the
stop. To protect against such arbitrary stops, the court properly
noted that an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
78. Id. at 658-60. See generally Automobile Spot Checks, supra note 17.
79. 440 U.S. 648, 660 (1979).
80. Goode v. State, 41 Md. App. 623, 630, 398 A.2d 801, 805, cert. denied, 285 Md.
730 (1979).
81. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
82. Goode v. State, 41 Md. App. 623, 630, 398 A.2d 801, 805, cert. denied, 285 Md.
730 (1979).
83. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
84. 41 Md. App. 623, 630, 398 A.2d 801, 805, cert. denied, 285 Md. 730 (1979).
85. Id. at 624-25, 398 A.2d at 802-03.
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facts that warrant a reasonable suspicion that a crime is being
committed, is about to be committed, or has been committed.86 If the
officer can make such a showing, the stop is constitutional.
Allowing a stop in the absence of reasonable suspicion would
grant police absolute discretion to stop any motorist without judicial
review of the exercise of discretion. 7 The abuse inherent in such a
procedure is readily apparent. The principal constitutional difficulty
is that the police could stop motorists for unarticulated reasons
which may, in fact, be based upon prejudices. Such stops, without the
safeguard of judicial review, would permit the police to engage in
"fishing expeditions" at the expense of the motoring public." The
potential for harassment of certain groups of citizens, such as
minority groups, inherent in random stops makes both the Goode
and Prouse decisions essential to insure the protection of fourth
amendment rights.
C. Roadblock Stops: A Possible Alternative
Roadblock stops involve the stopping of all oncoming traffic at a
fixed location to check the validity of the driver's license and the
vehicle registration.8 In Goode, the court noted that in holding that
random stops are unconstitutional, it was not implying that
roadblock stops are also prohibited.90 The Supreme Court in Prouse
mentioned that the roadblock stop might be a possible alternative to
the random stop.91 Both courts, relying upon a series of Supreme
Court cases sanctioning the use of roadblocks in searches for illegal
aliens at the Mexican border or its functional equivalent, 92 imply
that such a technique might be constitutional. Although a roadblock
may be a proper enforcement technique in regulating illegal alien
traffic, extending its use to licensing and registration checks is
unwarranted when analyzed in light of the Supreme Court's
balancing test.9 3
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,l the Supreme Court
sanctioned roadblock stops at fixed checkpoints to regulate the flow
86. Id. at 629-30, 398 A.2d at 805.
87. Id. at 630, 398 A.2d at 805.
88. Id.
89. Automobile Spot Checks, supra note 17, at 99-100.
90. 41 Md. App. 623, 628 n.5, 398 A.2d 801, 804 n.5. cert. denied. 285 Md. 730
(1979).
91. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). Prior to Prouse, the Court had reserved any comment
on the propriety of roadblock stops to check for licensing and registration. Id. at
656-57 n.13; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 n.8 (1974).
92. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976): United States v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
93. See text accompanying notes 30 & 31 supra.
94. 428 U.S. 543 (1975).
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of illegal alien traffic across the Mexican border.95 The roadblock stop
used in Martinez-Fuerte consisted of border patrol agents slowing all
oncoming traffic to a virtual standstill and then referring certain
motorists to a secondary area for brief questioning.9" Referrals to the
secondary area were not necessarily based on any reasonable
suspicion that a crime had been committed.97 In holding the
roadblock stop constitutional, the Court applied the traditional
balancing test, concluding that the governmental interest in curtail-
ing illegal alien traffic was great 98 and the intrusion upon the
interests of motorists minimal.99 In addition, the Court cited
statistical data which demonstrated the effectiveness of the road-
block'00 and expressed concern that elimination of the roadblock
would reduce the border patrol's ability to apprehend and deter
illegal alien traffic. 10
An analysis of the factors used in the balancing test in
Martinez-Fuerte demonstrates a strong governmental interest in the
seizure, an effective seizure method which promotes that governmen-
tal interest, and a minimal interference with the interests of the
individual. The governmental interest, therefore, outweighs the
individual interest and the roadblock stop at fixed checkpoints is
constitutional. Applying this balancing test to the use of roadblock
stops in licensing and registration checks, however, renders a
different result.
In licensing and registration cases, the state's interest is in
highway safety. 102 More specifically, enforcement of the licensing
requirement is designed to prevent unlicensed drivers from operat-
ing vehicles on the state's roads. Although the state has a valid
interest in eliminating highway safety problems, unlicensed drivers
may not be contributing to these problems. There is no data
available demonstrating that unlicensed drivers actually cause
safety problems. 0 3 There has been no showing by the state that
95. Id. at 566.
96. Id. at 546.
97. Id. at 547.
98. Id. at 551-53, 557. The Court cited statistical data as to the gravity of the
illegal alien problem, noting that anywhere from 1,000,000 to 12,000,000
illegal aliens enter the United States every year and that approximately 85%
cross the 2,000 mile long Mexican border. Id. at 551.
99. Id. at 557-58. The Court noted that the stop is brief, requiring at the most an
answer to several questions or the display of documents evidencing a right to
be in the country. Furthermore, the stop is conducted at a fixed checkpoint.
This lessens some of the anxiety and fear associated with a random stop made
by police without warning. Id. at 558.
100. Id. at 553.
101. Id. at 556-57.
102. See Goode v. State, 41 Md. App. 623, 630, 398 A.2d 801. 805, cert. delied, 285
Md. 730 (1979).
103. See note 73 supra.
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unlicensed drivers cause a significant number of accidents or commit
other traffic violations. In fact, there has been no estimate made as
to the number of unlicensed drivers in Maryland.' By comparison,
the federal government in Martinez-Fuerte demonstrated that the
illegal alien problem is one of enormous dimension in need of
immediate and strict regulatory measures. 105 In terms of the
balancing test, therefore, the state's interest in apprehending
unlicensed drivers is arguably weak in comparison to the federal
government's interest in apprehending illegal aliens.
Additionally, the balancing test requires consideration of the
extent to which the seizure promotes the governmental interest. 10 6 In
Martinez-Fuerte, the federal government showed that the roadblock
is successful for several distinct reasons. First, there are millions of
illegal aliens entering the country each year with the vast majority
crossing the Mexican border.' 7 Second, the fixed checkpoint road-
blocks are located on key highways where it is known that many
illegal aliens travel. 08 Third, the border patrol agents are trained to
detect illegal aliens when stopping motorists for questioning at
secondary areas.' °9 Finally, roadblocks at fixed checkpoints are the
most effective way to detect illegal aliens."10
The relative success of border search roadblocks probably could
not be repeated by the state in roadblocks for licensing checks.
Unlicensed drivers do not exist in vast numbers as do illegal aliens,
nor are they localized in any area of the state. There are also no
particular roads or highways that licensing violators travel, making
it inefficient to set up only a few roadblocks. If many roadblocks
were set up, the intrusion into the privacy of individuals would be
increased, thereby affecting the outcome of the balancing test and
increasing the chances of the unconstitutionality of such roadblocks.
Unlike many illegal aliens, unlicensed drivers cannot be detected
through outward characteristics. Stops for finding unlicensed drivers
would thus involve a greater period of detention than would be
involved in finding illegal aliens. Finally, the state has more
104. Id.
105. 428 U.S. 543, 551-53 (1979).
106. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1980).
107. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551 (1975).
108. Id. at 556-57.
109. Id. at 563 n.16. The government asserted that the border patrol is trained to
rely on several factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when making
referrals to secondary areas. Id.
110. Id. at 556. Roadblocks are set up on key highways, which helps border patrol
agents apprehend and deter illegal aliens. Those illegal aliens who are deterred
from using these highways are forced to travel upon roads of poorer quality,
which increases the possibility of their being apprehended by roving patrols of
border agents. Id. at 557.
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efficient means of apprehending licensing violators.11" ' Using the
roadlbock stop to apprehend licensing violators would require the
seizure of thousands of individuals in an effort to find a single
licensing violator. Such a method would be inconvenient, inefficient,
and ineffective.
The Court in Martinez-Fuerte also noted that the roadblock stop
was a minimal intrusion upon the motorist's fourth amendment
rights.'12 Border search roadblocks are set up at permanent check-
points and motorists know or can find out the location of these
checkpoints. 113 Only a small percentage of motorists are detained for
brief questioning. Most motorists are allowed to proceed
immediately. 1 4 Consequently, the potential interference with the
movement of traffic is minimal and the individual is unlikely to be
annoyed by the brief detention.1
In contrast, the roadblock stop for licensing checks probably
would be set up at a temporary location unknown to motorists until
they reached the roadblock.11 6 Each motorist would be stopped and
asked to display his license and registration card. The police officer
would then have to check the validity of'those documents with a
central record keeping facility. Whereas most motorists proceed
almost immediately in the border search roadblock, each motorist in
the licensing roadblock would be detained for a period of time,
questioned, and compelled to display the necessary documents. Such
an intrusion upon the motorist constitutes a higher degree of state
interference into private interests than is present in the border
search situation.
When the roadblock stop for licensing checks is scrutinized
under the balancing test, its constitutionality is questionable. The
state interest in the seizure is arguably weak, the seizure inefficient
in promoting that interest, and the intrusion upon the individual's
fourth amendment interest significant. It is conceivable that the
111. Goode v. State, 41 Md. App. 623, 630-31, 398 A.2d 801, 806, cert. denied, 285
Md. 730 (1979). The court noted that, even without random stops, adequate
means exist for protecting the state's interest in highway safety because "the
factual basis necessary to underpin the stop of a motorist for a spot or routine
check, is minimal indeed." Id. See generally Automobile Spot Checks, supra
note 17.
112. 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1975).
113. Id. at 559.
114. Id. at 546.
115. Id. at 558-59.
116. A permanent roadblock stop similar to those used at the Mexican border would
be ineffective because violators would simply avoid those locations by using
other roads. This does not happen in the border roadblock situation because
there are only a limited number of key highways crossing the Mexican border
and extending into major metropolitan areas. Consequently, illegal aliens are
forced to use these limited access routes. Id. at 556. Accord, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873, 882 (1975).
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state could demonstrate a serious problem with unlicensed drivers
and develop an effective roadblock procedure that would not
substantially intrude upon the individual interest. As it stands,
however, the problems inherent in the licensing roadblock tip the
scale in favor of the individual's fourth amendment rights and
should render that procedure unconstitutional.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decisions in Goode and in Prouse, eliminating random stops,
are necessary to insure that safeguards provided for in the fourth
amendment extend to motorists. The random stop is an offensive
police tactic unrelated to and unnecessary for a satisfactory program
of highway safety. In light of the absolute discretion exercised by
police in making random stops, the potential for misuse is too great
to allow random stops to continue. Unfortunately, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland and the Supreme Court have implicitly
approved the roadblock stop which is just as troublesome and
offensive to the motorist as the random stop. Roadblock stops for
licensing checks have been implicitly sanctioned even in the absence
of any showing by the state that the unlicensed driver poses a
significant highway safety problem and that the implementation of
this method would reduce such a problem if in fact it exists.
When analyzed in relation to the Supreme Court's balancing
test, the roadblock for licensing and registration checks is unreason-
able. The substantial dissimilarity between illegal alien roadblocks
and licensing roadblocks indicates that the constitutionality of the
method in the former situations cannot be transferred to the latter.
If the licensing roadblock is put into practice, its constitutionality
should be challenged. A motorist should be permitted to move about
freely without being stopped by police authorities for any reason
other than a traffic violation, equipment problem, or reasonable
suspicion of some criminal activity.
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